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A CONSTANT BATTLE: THE EVOLVING 
CHALLENGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
FIGHT AGAINST DOPING IN SPORT 
JESSICA K. FOSCHI* 
The practice of sport is a human right.  Every individual must have 
the possibility of practicing sport, without discrimination of any kind 
and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual understanding with 
a spirit of friendship, solidarity, and fair play.1 
 
Doping is fundamentally contrary to the spirit of sport.2 
INTRODUCTION 
Sport provides many benefits to the world community that 
should be lauded and commended.  Every day, all over the world, the 
competitive spirit of sport leads individuals of all varieties to the 
playing fields and sporting arenas of their communities. Athletics 
promote health, leadership, commitment, fair play, and general 
interaction among human beings across the globe.  From the local 
little league baseball diamond to the iconic stadiums of the Olympic 
Games, sport touches individuals in every country and from every 
walk of life.  However, the same passions, which inspire the positive 
elements of sport can lead to negative consequences.  The most 
blatant and widespread example of this passion gone awry is the 
rampant use of banned substances by athletes at all levels of sport to 
gain an unfair competitive advantage. 
Doping in sports has become the biggest challenge facing the 
positive goals of the Olympic Movement.  Nothing undermines the 
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 1. Int’l Olympic Comm. [IOC], Olympic Charter (2004), at 9, available at 
http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2006). 
 2. World Anti-Doping Agency [WADA], World Anti-Doping Code [hereinafter the 
Code], at 3, available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code_v3.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2006). 
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principles of “fair play” more than athletes giving themselves an 
unfair artificial advantage while others rely on their natural potential.  
In 1999, the world of sport took a meaningful step to address this 
problem, with the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA)3 and the promulgation of the World Anti-Doping Code 
(“the Code”).4  The major achievements of WADA have been its 
ability to unify the fight against doping and provide a uniform code of 
doping standards.5  However, the first six years of WADA’s existence 
reveal that problem areas remain. 
Accordingly, this Note will discuss problems of unregulated 
nutritional supplements and shortcomings in the international effort 
to keep up with designer drugs and new doping methods—persistent 
obstacles to WADA’s efforts.  Additionally, the strict liability 
standard adopted by WADA6 effectively shifts the burden of these 
obstacles onto the athletes.  Until the gap can be closed in the areas 
of regulation and testing, WADA must do more to shoulder this 
burden.  Otherwise, the prevalence of false positive tests7 will 
continue, risking the careers and reputations of innocent athletes.   
Part I of this Note will provide a brief discussion of doping 
regulations prior to the 1999 formation of WADA.  Part II will 
highlight some of the changes that WADA has made to the fight 
against doping.  Part III will detail the recent case of Kicker Vencill, 
an American swimmer who tested positive for a steroid precursor in 
2003.  Part IV will use the Vencill case to discuss the inadequacies of 
current testing.  Part V will provide a discussion of WADA’s strict 
liability standard in light of the Vencill case.  Finally, Part VI will 
present suggestions for improvement to the system.  While doping is 
 
 3. WADA, Mission,  
http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=255 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) 
(“The World Anti-Doping Agency was created to promote, coordinate, and monitor at the 
international level the fight against doping in sport in all its forms.”). 
 4. WADA, What Is the Code, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page 
Category.id=364 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) (“The Code is the core document that provides the 
framework for anti-doping policies, rules, and regulations within sport organizations and among 
public authorities.”). 
 5. Infra discussion Section III. 
 6. The strict liability standard is embodied implicitly in Article 2. and explicitly in the 
Comment to Article 2.1.1.  The Code, supra note 2, at 8. 
 7. The Note uses the term “false positive test” to describe the situation where a positive 
test result is caused by an outside source (not the athlete) such as the inadvertent ingestion of a 
banned substance, or sabotage (among other possibilities).  This situation involves no intention 
on the part of the athlete to cheat or gain an unfair competitive advantage. 
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clearly an international problem, this Note will use examples and 
events from the United States. 
I.  THE PRE-WADA REGIME 
Prior to WADA’s formation in November of 1999, a complex 
system of organizations governed doping in sports.  This pre-WADA 
system was seen as complicated, archaic, and unfair.  Michael 
Straubel has even referred to it as “the Byzantine and dysfunctional 
world of anti-doping control.”8  He further described this system from 
the athletes’ perspective as one that “ignore[d] basic notions of due 
process by incorrectly assigning burdens, issue[d] punishment before 
holding a hearing and use[d] biased arbitrators.”9  Even athletes that 
were routinely tested seldom knew about or understood the drug 
testing rules.10  In order to understand the pre-WADA system, a brief 
review of the structure of international sports governance is 
necessary. 
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) heads the Olympic 
Movement, and its authority includes doping regulation.11  In order 
for a sport to be included in the Olympics, the sport must have an 
IOC-recognized International Federation (IF).12  An IF is charged 
with creating the rules for the sport it governs, organizing and holding 
competitions in the sport other than the Olympics, and establishing 
criteria for the selection of Olympic teams.13  Below the IFs are the 
National Governing Bodies (NGB) of each sport in each country.14  
NGBs act similarly to IFs, yet they govern nationally rather than 
internationally.  Each country that participates in the Olympics also 
has a National Olympic Committee (NOC) charged with overseeing 
 
 8. Michael S. Straubel, Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process in 
International Sport, 106 DICK. L. REV. 523, 531 (2002). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Jill Pilgrim & Kim Betz, A Journey Through Olympic Drug Testing Rules: A 
Practitioner’s Guide to Understanding Drug Testing Within the Olympic Movement, 2 VAND. J. 
ENT. L. & PRAC. 210, 211 (2000). 
 11. Straubel, supra note 8, at 532 (“[T]he Olympic Movement is still the blueprint that 
governs the distribution of control and power in international sports. International legitimacy 
begins with and flows from the Olympic Games including doping control.”). 
 12. Id.  Some examples of IFs are the International Association of Athletics Federations 
(IAAF) for track and field, the Federation Internationale de Football (FIFA) for soccer, and 
the Federation Internationale de Natation (FINA) for aquatic sports. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.  For example, in the United States, U.S. Track & Field (U.S. T&F) is the NGB 
under the IAAF for track and field; US Soccer is the NGB under FIFA; and USA Swimming is 
the NGB for swimming under FINA. 
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the county’s Olympic entries.15  Whether a NOC has authority over 
the NGBs only in Olympic years, or in both Olympic and non-
Olympic years depends upon the country.16 
Before the creation of WADA, the IOC set the testing 
procedures and the list of prohibited substances for the Olympic 
Games.17  However, outside of the Olympic Games, each IF 
controlled its own testing procedures, created its own prohibited 
substance list, and regulated the timing and frequency of testing.18  
The NGBs and NOCs were then in charge of enforcing the rules 
established by their IF and the IOC.19 
The first problem this type of system created was inconsistency—
between sports,20 between the IOC and IFs, and between IFs and 
NGBs21 (which were influenced by the domestic laws of their 
country).  These inconsistencies were compounded by the conflicts of 
interest, which arose from an NGB’s prosecution of its own athletes.22  
The NGBs had a strong incentive to favor its own athletes in its 
proceedings.23 
Furthermore, cases could often be appealed (depending on the 
IF’s rules) to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS),24 a tribunal 
created by the IOC to “bring order to the chaotic and inconsistent 
 
 15. Straubel, supra note 8, at 532. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 533. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See, e.g., id. at 539 (“[T]he IAAF rules place the burden of proof on the IAAF to prove 
that a doping offense occurred. In contrast, FINA places the burden of challenging the testing 
procedures on the athlete.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 841 F. Supp. 1444, 1448 (S.D. Ohio 
1992) (IAAF overturned the decision of The Athletic Congress (later U.S. T&F)); Foschi v. 
Federation Internationale de Natation Amateure, CAS 1996/156 (Ct. Arb. Sport 1996) (FINA 
overturned the decision of the U.S. Swimming Board of Directors and American Arbitration 
Association panel); Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 587 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(IAAF overturned decision of U.S. T&F and found that Slaney had committed a doping 
violation). 
 22. See, e.g., Travis T. Tygart, Winners Never Dope and Finally, Dopers Never Win: 
USADA Takes Over Drug Testing of United States Olympic Athletes, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 124, 126-27 (2003) (noting that the precursor to USADA, NADP, was 
criticized for having financial and other interests in having the best US athletes compete, and 
therefore had little incentive to find that they had committed a doping violation). 
 23. Id. at 127. 
 24. Straubel, supra note 8, at 539. 
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world of international sports adjudications.”25  The CAS has, in effect, 
developed its own body of case law by applying “general principles of 
law and concepts of natural justice” rather than the law of any 
particular country.26  The CAS also usually hears cases de novo, and, 
therefore, does not necessarily have to rely on the findings of the IF.27  
While the CAS was helpful to some degree because of its 
independence, it could not always make up for the confusion resulting 
from the inconsistencies among the IOC, IFs, NGBs, and NOCs.28 
II.  WADA: ON THE RIGHT TRACK 
Though the international community was aware of the system’s 
problems, the proverbial “straw that broke the camel’s back” was the 
1998 Tour de France doping scandal.29  After French police found 
large quantities of prohibited substances in a car belonging to Festina, 
a French cycling team, the police began raiding many of the other 
teams on the tour.30  These raids led to drop-outs by several teams and 
individuals and the discovery of more banned substances.31  The 1998 
Tour scandal was a reflection of the worldwide doping problem 
exhibited through a popular international sport and provided the 
catalyst for a larger, more comprehensive effort to fight doping.32  As 
a result of the Tour scandal, the IOC organized the World 
Conference on Doping in Sport in Lausanne, Switzerland, in 
 
 25. Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1207 (2005). 
 26. Straubel, supra note 8, at 542. 
 27. Id. at 543. 
 28. James A.R. Nafziger, Dispute Resolution in the Arena of International Sports 
Competition, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 161, 179 (2002) (“The [CAS] likely will play an increasingly 
important role in itself and in establishing appropriate relationships among sanction-applying 
and sanction-reviewing institutions.  Quite likely, however, the institutional structure for 
resolving disputes will remain complex.”). 
 29. WADA, A Brief History of Anti-Doping, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2? 
pageCategory.id=253 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) [hereinafter History of Anti-Doping]. 
 30. Tour Tarnished by Drugs Scandal, BBC NEWS, Aug. 3, 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 
special_report/1998/07/98/tour_de_france/144326.stm. 
 31. Id. 
 32. But see Straubel, supra note 8, at 555 (“[W]hile uniformity and efficiency may be the 
stated purpose of the Anti-Doping Code, the unstated purpose may very well be to improve 
public relations. Recent doping scandals threaten the future of the Olympic Movement . . . . 
Such an image will seriously curtail sponsorship and money to the Olympic Movement. Shortly 
after the Tour de France scandal, many sponsors threatened to withdraw support.  Even though 
the IOC benefits from the public attention created by drug produced world records, it would 
suffer from the mass exodus of sponsors and viewers.”). 
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February 1999.33  This conference sought to create “an independent 
international agency, which would set unified standards for anti-
doping work and coordinate the efforts of sports organizations and 
public authorities.”34  The resulting organization, WADA, officially 
came into being on November 10, 1999.35 
WADA implements and oversees the World Anti-Doping 
Program (“the Program”), which consists of the Code, International 
Standards (including the Prohibited List, Testing Standards, 
Laboratory Standards, Standards for Therapeutic Use Exemptions), 
and Models of Best Practice.36  The dual purposes of the Program and 
the Code are, first, “[t]o protect the Athlete’s fundamental right to 
participate in doping-free sport and thus promote health, fairness, 
and equality for Athletes worldwide;” and, second, “[t]o ensure 
harmonized, coordinated and effective anti-doping programs at the 
international level with regard to detection, deterrence and 
prevention of doping.”37  Both the Code and the International 
Standards are mandatory upon an IF’s acceptance of the Code, while 
the Models of Best Practice are recommended, but not mandatory.38  
Since WADA’s formation, virtually every sporting organization in the 
world has accepted the Code.39  Therefore, WADA has achieved 
major success in at least one of its goals, the harmonization of anti-
doping programs. 
WADA has also lessened the conflicts of interest, which were a 
major problem before its inception.  Most countries now have a 
National Anti-Doping Organization (NADO), which oversees the 
WADA-type responsibilities for that country.40  A NADO has the 
“primary authority and responsibility to adopt and implement anti-
doping rules, direct the collection of samples, the management of test 
results, and the conduct of hearings all at the national level.”41  Before 
WADA, an athlete contesting a positive test result would go through 
 
 33. History of Anti-Doping, supra note 29. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. The Code, supra note 2, at 3. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1. 
 39. WADA, Code, Acceptance, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page 
Category.id=270 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).  Note that no American professional sports have 
accepted the Code as of the date of this publication. 
 40. The Code, supra note 2, at 75. 
 41. Id. 
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the procedures set out by their NGB.42  Now, the athlete goes through 
the NADO.  NADOs are usually independent of the NGBs and 
NOCs, which helps eliminate the conflicts of interest stemming from 
organizations prosecuting and adjudicating the doping violations of 
their own athletes.  Additionally, the NADO applies the rules of the 
IF of the athlete’s sport.  Since all IFs must adopt anti-doping rules, 
which conform with the Code,43 the NADO effectively applies one 
system of rules to all athletes.  Similarly, on the international level, 
CAS (rather than the IFs) is responsible for hearing all appeals from 
NADOs.44 
WADA is meant to be a complete umbrella organization, 
governing even professional sports.45  It is, therefore, a goal of 
WADA to encourage professional sports organizations to sign onto 
the Code.46  The success of this goal has been mixed.  For example, 
when the IOC first asked each IF to accept its new Anti-Doping 
Code, FIFA “balked at some of the provisions in the Code and felt 
that it had the independence to go its own way.”47  Indeed, 
professional sports, which have large amounts of resources and loyal 
fan bases do not necessarily need the Olympics in order to maintain 
their popularity.48  Despite this fact, WADA and FIFA completed a 
November 2001 agreement allowing FIFA to “conduct an 
independent drug-testing regime and establish its own sanction 
 
 42. See Straubel, supra note 8, at 534 (using the example of Butch Reynold’s case to 
demonstrate what an athlete had to do to contest a positive test result under the pre-WADA 
system). 
 43. The Code, supra note 2, art. 20.3.1, at 55. 
 44. Id. art. 13.2.1, at 38. 
 45. The Code, supra note 2, at 1 (“The Code is the fundamental and universal document 
upon which the World Anti-Doping Program in sport is based.”) (emphasis added). 
 46. WADA, Q&A on the Code, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page 
Category.id=367 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) (“WADA has contacted many of these leagues and, 
with the support of governments and other sports organizations, hopes that all of them will 
accept and implement the Code in order to have one single standard for all athletes in all sports 
and in all countries.”). 
 47. Straubel, supra note 8, at 533. 
 48. See Sarah Baldwin, Note, Performance Enhancing Drug Use in Olympic Sports: A 
Comparison of the United States and Australian Approaches, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 265, 273 (2002) (noting that the IOC has to fight to keep soccer in the Olympic games 
because “FIFA is not dependent upon the IOC for its funding or existence”). 
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schedule.”49  However, while FIFA has adopted the Code, it usually 
only sends developing players to compete in the Olympics.50 
In a separate effort, the Olympic charter has been amended to 
mandate the adoption of the Code in order for a sport to be included 
in the Olympic Games.51  However, professional sports organizations 
(such as the NBA and NFL) that have yet to adopt the Code can still 
send players to events under the jurisdiction of organizations that 
have adopted it as long as the players comply with the Code at the 
particular event.52  Although this is not exactly the “mandatory” 
compliance that the Code calls for, “it suggests that WADA’s 
potential to transcend Olympic sport and influence professional 
athletics is very real.”53 
While there is no doubt that WADA has unified the anti-doping 
infrastructure and has provided an independent54 body to oversee the 
adjudication of doping cases, there are still many areas that require 
revision and improvement.  As mentioned earlier, WADA has been 
very successful in fulfilling one of its stated purposes, harmonization.  
However, it has been far less successful in the pursuit of its other 
stated purpose, protection of the athlete.  The remainder of this Note 
will analyze WADA’s current efforts to fulfill this latter purpose and 
provide suggestions for greater success.  The following case highlights 
some of the imperfections remaining in the WADA Code. 
 
 49. Edward H. Jurith & Mark W. Beddoes, The United States’ and International Response 
to the Problem of Doping in Sports, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 461, 483-84 
(2002). 
 50. Baldwin, supra note 48, at 273. 
 51. WADA, Q&A on the Code, http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=367 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 49, at 483-84. 
 54. While WADA is clearly independent of IFs and NGBs, its independence is undermined 
by its strong ties to the IOC, which paid twenty-five million dollars for its establishment and 
covers fifty percent of its annual budget.  See IOC, Protection of Athletes: Activities of the 
International Olympic Committee, 
http://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/missions/athletesuk.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
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III.  VENCILL V. USADA55 
To begin the discussion of the inadequacies of the current anti-
doping system, it is helpful to examine a recent real-world example.  
On January 21, 2003, a twenty-five-year-old American swimmer 
named Kicker Vencill tested positive for 19-norandrosterone (a 
byproduct of nandrolone and a steroid precursor) in a routine out-of-
competition drug test.56  The test, administered by the United States 
Anti-Doping Agency (the NADO for the United States, hereinafter 
USADA) and performed by the accredited UCLA laboratory, 
showed Vencill’s urine sample contained 4.3 ng/ml of 19-
norandrosterone,57 just above the 2 ng/ml level which triggers a 
positive test.58  USADA recommended a four-year suspension from 
the date of the test and a six-month retroactive cancellation of all 
competitive results from that date.59  Vencill elected to contest the 
proposed sanctions and exercised his right to a hearing before a panel 
of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).60  The AAA 
hearing was held on June 21 and 22, 2003, and on July 24, an arbitral 
decision suspended Vencill for four years but did not require any 
retroactive cancellation of competitive results.61  Due to Vencill’s 
suspension, he was removed from the United States’ roster for the 
2003 Pan American games, and he missed the 2004 Olympic Trials.62 
Maintaining his innocence, Vencill had all the nutritional 
supplements he was taking tested for banned substances, even though 
 
 55. This case is used in this Note to highlight the problem of inadvertent ingestion of 
banned substances through the taking of contaminated nutritional supplements; the Note does 
not purport to validate or invalidate Mr. Vencill’s claims of innocence.  The Note does, 
however, mean to purport that Mr. Vencill’s situation is representative of other cases like it.  
See, e.g., Hans Knauss v. Int’l Ski Fed’n, CAS 2005/A/847 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2005) (finding that an 
Austrian skier who took a contaminated nutritional supplement, which led to his positive drug 
test should have his sanction reduced from two years to eighteen months because he barely fit 
under the no significant fault or negligence standard because he had inquired about the product 
directly to the distributor and personally knew and trusted a supplier of the supplement in 
Austria). 
 56. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Vencill, AAA No. 30 190 00291 03, 3-4 (American 
Arbitration Association, 2003) [hereinafter Vencill AAA Decision]. 
 57. Id. at 7 (noting a study which found a grey zone between 2 ng/ml and 5 ng/ml, due to 
the possibility of endogenous production). 
 58. Id. at 13 
 59. Id. at 4. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 22 n.26. 
 62. Kicker Vencill, 20 Question Tuesday Archive, USA SWIMMING, May 17, 2005, 
http://www.usaswimming.org/USASWeb/ViewMiscArticle.aspx?TabId=280&Alias=Rainbow&
Lang=en&mid=408&ItemId=1706 [hereinafter Kicker Vencill]. 
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none of them, according to their labels, contained any banned 
substances.63  The results from the private lab showed that a 
multivitamin that Vencill had been taking—Super Complete 
manufactured by Ultimate Nutrition—was tainted with three 
different steroid precursors.64  Vencill took this new information to his 
appeal from AAA to the CAS hearing, held on November 10, 2003. 
On July 11, 2003, subsequent to Vencill’s AAA hearing but prior 
to his appeal to CAS, the Federation Internationale du Natation 
[FINA], the international federation for swimming, adopted 
WADA’s Code.65  Under the Code, when an international federation 
or other “Anti-Doping Organization” adopts the code, Articles 1, 2, 
3, 10, 11, 13 (with exception of one provision), “must be incorporated 
essentially verbatim by each Anti-Doping Organization in its own 
anti-doping rules.”66  These new rules adopted under the Code went 
into effect, as far as FINA was concerned, on September 11, 2003.67  
This being the case, FINA’s original requirement of a four-year ban 
for a first offense was reduced to a two-year ban under the new 
Article 10.2.68 
Article 10.2, however, was not the only rule change that was 
considered in the CAS decision.  In light of Vencill’s private testing of 
his multivitamin, he argued that, under newly adopted Article 10.5.1 
(“No Fault or Negligence”)69 or, in the alternative, 10.5.2 (“No 
Significant Fault or Negligence”),70 his sanction should be eliminated 
or reduced.71  The CAS panel cursorily dismissed Vencill’s 10.5.1 
claim,72 pointing to the 10.5.2 comment, which gives the following 
example of when the “no fault or negligence” standard would not 
apply: “a positive test resulting from a mislabeled or contaminated 
vitamin or nutritional supplement.”73  The panel also rejected 
Vencill’s argument that he should get a reduced sanction under 
10.5.2, but it provided a more thorough analysis for their 10.5.2 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Vencill v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2004/A/484, at 11 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2004) 
[hereinafter Vencill CAS Decision]. 
 66. The Code, supra note 2, at 7. 
 67. Vencill CAS Decision, CAS 2004/A/484, at 11 n.12. 
 68. The Code, supra note 2, art. 10.2, at 26. 
 69. Id. art. 10.5.1. 
 70. Id. art. 10.5.2. 
 71. Vencill CAS Decision, CAS 2004/A/484, at 19. 
 72. Id. at 20-21. 
 73. The Code, supra note 2, art. 10.5.2 comment, at 30. 
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holding.74  First, the panel qualified its comments by finding that 
Vencill’s multivitamin was contaminated, that Vencill did not know of 
the contamination, that he was taking this multivitamin at the time of 
his January 2003 test, and that the contamination is what led to the 
positive test.75  Despite these findings, the panel reprimanded Vencill 
for not living up to the Article 2.1.1 standard, which reads: 
It is each Athlete’s personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited 
Substances enters his or her body. Athletes are responsible for any 
Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers found to be 
present in their bodily Specimens. Accordingly, it is not necessary 
that intent, fault, negligence or knowing Use on the Athlete’s part 
be demonstrated in order to establish an anti-doping violation 
under Article 2.1.76 
In concluding that he did not live up to this standard, the panel said 
that his conduct—including ignoring the many warnings he received 
from USADA regarding the risk involved in taking nutritional 
supplements, and also taking a variety of supplements recommended 
to him by teammates without consulting a parent, coach, or doctor, 
and without getting them tested—”amount[ed] to a total disregard of 
his positive duty,” and that his “‘fault or negligence’ in the 
circumstances [was] exceptionally ‘significant.’”77  Finally, the panel 
said of Vencill: 
We hold that for an athlete in this day and age to rely—as this 
athlete claims he did—on the advice of friends and on product 
labels when deciding to use supplements and vitamins, is 
tantamount to a type of willful blindness for which he must be held 
responsible. This “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” attitude 
in the face of what rightly has been called the scourge of doping in 
sport—this failure to exercise the slightest caution in the 
circumstances—is not only unacceptable and to be condemned, it is 
a far cry from the attitude and conduct expected of an athlete 
seeking the mitigation of his sanction for a doping violation under 
applicable FINA Rules.78 
Ultimately, The CAS Panel sanctioned Vencill with a full two-year 
suspension under the newly adopted FINA Rules.79  After being 
banned from swimming for two years, Vencill brought suit against 
Ultimate Nutrition, the Connecticut-based supplement manufacturer 
 
 74. Vencill CAS Decision, CAS 2004/A/484, at 22-25. 
 75. Id. at 23. 
 76. The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1.1, at 8. 
 77. Vencill CAS Decision, CAS 2004/A/484, at 25. 
 78. Id. (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. 
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that produces Super Complete.  Armed with his evidence from the 
private testing of his supplements, he sued Ultimate Nutrition in 
Orange County Superior Court in California. In May of 2005, a 
unanimous jury awarded Vencill $578,635, finding that his Ultimate 
Nutrition multivitamin was contaminated with a steroid precursor.80  
Vencill found this holding an inadequate substitute for his chance to 
swim, however.  In an interview for USA Swimming’s website on May 
17, 2005, Vencill said “all the money in the world can’t rewind the 
clock.”81 
Based on Ultimate Nutrition’s own private testing on capsules 
from the same as those purportedly taken by Vencill, and capsules 
from surrounding lots, which were all negative for steroid precursors, 
the company requested that the California Superior Court vacate the 
decision against them.82  In July 2005, the California Superior Court 
granted Ultimate Nutrition’s request to vacate the decision.83  
Following this decision, the parties settled. 84 
IV.  INADEQUACIES OF TESTING 
A. Unregulated Nutritional Supplements 
As evidenced by the Vencill case, the possibility that unregulated 
nutritional supplements may be contaminated with banned 
substances poses a pressing problem in the fight against doping.  The 
Code holds the athlete liable in such an event.85  A discussion of the 
efficacy and fairness of this rule will follow in Part VI. 
In an IOC-funded study led by Professor Dr. Wilhelm Schänzer 
at German Sport University in Cologne (as referenced in Vencill), 
Professor Schänzer found that many supplements whose labels 
indicated that they contained no banned substances (or failed to 
indicate that they did) tested positive for prohormones.86  The study, 
 
 80. Vencill Was Suspended Two Years, Missed Olympics, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 13, 
2005, available at http://www.sports.espn.go.com/oly/news/story?id=2059714. 
 81. Kicker Vencill, supra note 62. 
 82. Press Release, Health Strategy Consulting L.L.C., Court Vacates Judgment against 
Ultimate Nutrition in the Matter of Kicker Vencill v. Ultimate Nutrition (July 19, 2005), 
available at http://www.health-strategy.com/contentmgr/showdetails.php/id/2350. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1.1, at 3. 
 86. Dr. Wilhelm Schänzer, Analysis of Non-Hormonal Nutritional Supplements for 
Anabolic-Anrogenic Steroids—An International Study, 2001, at 85, available at  
http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_324.pdf. 
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conducted from October 2000 to November 2001, analyzed 634 non-
hormonal nutritional supplements from thirteen countries and 215 
different suppliers, obtained through different methods (stores, 
Internet, phone, and two samples from the IOC).87  Additionally, 289 
of 634 supplements were from companies that also sell prohormones, 
while 345 of the supplements were from companies that do not offer 
prohormones at all.88  Ninety-four of these supplements (14.8%) were 
found to contain prohormones—of either testosterone, nandrolone, 
or both.89  These supplements were bought in the Netherlands, 
Austria, the United Kingdom, and the United States and were 
attributable to companies located in the United States, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany.90  The level of 
anabolic androgenic steroid concentrations found in the ninety-four 
positive supplements ranged from 0.01 ng/g up to 190 ng/g.91  Probably 
the most alarming finding of the study was “[e]xcretion studies with 
application of supplements containing nandrolone prohormones 
corresponding to a total uptake of more than 1 ng resulted in urinary 
concentrations of the nandrolone metabolite norandrosterone above 
the cut-off limit of the IOC for several hours (positive doping result).”92 
Only one study, in which ninety-four supplements tested positive 
for androgenic steroid concentrations, demonstrate conclusively that 
there are multiple supplements on the market, manufactured and sold 
in different countries that contain banned substances.  Furthermore, 
the IOC itself endorsed and funded the Schänzer study, giving its 
results more prominence and credibility.93  The Schänzer study 
indicates that positive results for nandrolone and testosterone may 
indeed be caused by contaminated supplements. 
The study also demonstrated that 9.6% of the supplements tested 
came from companies that do not sell any prohormone products.94  
For these supplements to test positive, either the company is 
manufacturing these products at a factory that manufactures other 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Dr. Wilhelm Schänzer, Analysis of Non-Hormonal Nutritional Supplements for 
Anabolic-Anrogenic Steroids—An International Study, 2001, at 85, available at 
http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_324.pdf (emphasis added). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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companies’ products, which do contain prohormones, or the company 
is adding prohormones to its own products and not indicating this on 
their labels.  Either of these alternatives increases the difficulty for 
athletes of determining which supplements are safer to use than 
others. 
While legislation to provide for the comprehensive regulation of 
all dietary supplements would be an ideal solution, it is unlikely that 
there could be an across-the-board regulation imposed.  Variations in 
regulations exist from country to country and from substance to 
substance, and this is unlikely to change any time soon.  Yet, WADA 
must address the realities of the supplement world, whether or not 
adequate legislation is enacted.  Such remedies will be discussed 
below in Parts V and VI. 
B. Testing Technology 
The vast improvements that have been made in the technology of 
testing still lag behind the technology, expertise, and skill of the 
cheaters themselves.  For example, just prior to the 2004 Athens 
Olympics, the exposure of the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative 
(BALCO) scandal involving some of America’s top track and field 
athletes rocked the United States.95  BALCO supplied some of these 
athletes with tetrahydrogestrinome (THG, or colloquially, “the 
Clear”), a new designer drug.96  THG was only identified after a 
prominent coach came forward and sent a syringe containing THG to 
the USADA.97  The USADA then used the THG from the syringe to 
develop a test for detecting the substance.98  On the eve of the Sydney 
Olympic Games, the international sporting community faced the 
shock of having a new undetectable drug in use by many of the big 
names set to compete, without any means of testing for the substance.  
The BALCO scandal, while a huge embarrassment for the United 
States, was an equally large embarrassment for the international 
sporting community.  If top athletes, who were regularly tested by 
their NADO could circumvent their NADO’s testing technology by 
using substances not yet tested for, how could the system maintain 
credibility? 
 
 95. I Was THG Whistleblower, Admits Gatlin Coach, Athens Olympics 2004—ABC Sport, 
Aug. 23, 2004, http://www.abc.net.au/sport/content/200408/s1182730.htm. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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The BALCO scandal illustrates how athletes can cleverly 
undermine testing standards and procedures, while anti-doping 
agencies struggle to maintain accuracy and credibility in the system.  
For example, anabolic steroids were in wide-spread use long before a 
reliable test for them was developed in 1974.99  While testing made up 
some ground, athletes wanting to cheat began blood doping.100  Yet, 
blood doping was not added to the prohibited list until 1986.101  
Erythropoetin (more commonly known as EPO) became a popular 
drug, especially among cyclists, and was added to the prohibited list in 
1990.102  Yet, a reliable testing method for EPO was not implemented 
until the 2000 Sydney Olympics.103  Part of this pattern is clearly 
attributable to the lack of coordination in the world of sports of 
doping prior to WADA discussed above in Part I.  Indeed, the 
response to BALCO and THG seems swift and effective compared to 
prior discoveries of previously undetectable substances.  While a 
positive sign for the future, the race between athletes trying to find 
new designer drugs and methods, and the anti-doping effort to find 
ways to test for those drugs and methods, seems far from over. 
Besides the problem of testing falling behind the cheaters, there 
are also questions in regard to the accuracy of the current testing.  
Most of the prohibited substances on the WADA List are of an 
exogenous nature, meaning that they are “not ordinarily capable of 
being produced by the body naturally.”104  Therefore, when a 
laboratory test reveals the presence of such a substance in the 
athlete’s specimen, it is reasonable to assume that the substance was 
introduced into the athlete’s body by some outside source.  However, 
the WADA List also contains certain prohibited substances, which 
can be produced endogenously (by the human body naturally).105  
These substances are subject not to mere detection, but to detection 
in excess of a pre-determined level or ratio.106  This level is deemed to 
be where the concentration of the substance in the specimen “so 
 
 99. History of Anti-Doping, supra note 29. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. WADA Int’l Standard, The 2006 Prohibited List, at 4, available at http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/2006_LIST.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Prohibited List]. 
 105. Id. 
 106. The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1.3, at 9. 
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deviates from the range of values normally found in humans that it is 
unlikely to be consistent with normal endogenous production.”107 
Such levels or ratios continue to be a hotly contested issue.  The 
most notable case to confront this issue was that of Mary Slaney.108  
Mary Slaney tested positive for testosterone at the U.S. Olympic 
Track and Field Trials in 1996.109  A positive test for testosterone at 
the time required a ratio of testosterone to epitestosterone (T/E 
ratio) greater than six-to-one.110  Slaney argued that such a ratio was 
not reliable, especially with regard to women.111  She claimed that her 
heightened T/E ratio was due to the combination of her menstrual 
cycle and changing birth control pills. 112  USA T&F ruled for Slaney, 
finding that “the IAAF’s rules regarding the use of the T/E ratio test 
were vague and inconsistent and the six to one ratio was not 
scientifically proven to be inconsistent with the normal ratio in 
humans.”113  However, the IAAF found that their rules were clear, 
and that Slaney had committed a doping offense.114  Regardless of the 
validity of Slaney’s claims, her case brings to light the problems 
associated with these ratios and levels provided for in the Code.  On 
the one hand, WADA must somehow define the illegal level; yet, on 
the other hand scientists have conducted studies to show that humans 
(especially elite athletes) can naturally produce levels higher than 
those provided for under the Code.115  If true, the imperfect science 
behind these ratios are putting athletes at risk for false positive 
testing results. 
The Code does provide some additional protections to guard 
against this risk.  For example, if the athlete can prove that the 
concentration in their specimen is due to a “physiological or 
pathological condition,” the sample will not be deemed to contain a 
 
 107. 2006 Prohibited List, supra note 104, at 3. 
 108. Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 580 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 109. Id. at 586. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Slaney, 244 F.3d at 587. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See, e.g., B. Le Bizec et al., Evidence for the Presence of Endogenous 19- 
Norandrosterone in Human Urine, 723 J. CHROMATOGRAPHY BIOMEDICAL SCI. APPLICATIONS 
157, 169-71 (1999) (finding that intense efforts in soccer competition have been observed to 
increase endogenous levels of 19-norandrosterone by a factor of three and suggesting that even 
more intense exertions could increase the levels by even higher factors). 
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prohibited substance.116  Additionally, the testing itself can sometimes 
determine whether the substance in the specimen, although capable 
of endogenous production, actually is of exogenous origin.117  In this 
case, a valid positive test will be declared.118  In other, more 
questionable situations, there might be further investigation such as 
an examination of the athlete’s past tests and/or subsequent testing.119  
Despite these protections, the scientific jury is still out on these levels, 
and it appears that there is enough debate to assume that this is 
another area where athletes are at risk for false positive test results. 
C. Towards the Future: Gene Doping 
The challenges facing the international community are only 
going to get tougher as time and technology advance.  WADA 
recently held its second-ever Gene Doping Symposium in Stockholm, 
Sweden, on December 4-5, 2005.120  Participants, hailing from fifteen 
different countries, included geneticists and other biomedical 
scientists, ethicists, public policy experts, and IOC representatives.121  
The conference focused on research, education, and progress.122  
Conference participants opined that, although it is not believed that 
gene doping is currently being used by athletes, there is a distinct 
likelihood that it will be in the future.123  Gene doping124—or gene 
transfer—”represents a proven, although very immature and still 
experimental field of human medicine.”125  The conference also found 
that the process of gene doping is a dangerous one, and there should 
be education at every level of athletics to guard against these 
dangers.126 
 
 116. 2006 Prohibited List, supra note 104, at 3. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 3-4. 
 120. WADA, Gene Doping Symposium Reaches Conclusions and Recommendations, Dec. 
5, 2005, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/newsarticle.ch2?articleId=3115229 [hereinafter Gene 
Doping Symposium]. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Defined as “[t]he non-theraputic use of cells, genes, genetic elements, or of the 
modulation of gene expression, having the capacity to enhance athletic performance.”  2006 
Prohibited List, supra note 104, at 7. 
 125. Gene Doping Symposium, supra note 120. 
 126. Id. 
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WADA is clearly taking an aggressive approach to future doping 
issues, which is a positive sign for the future of sport.  There has also 
been substantial research into detection methods for gene transfer, 
and gene doping is already listed as a prohibited method on WADA’s 
2006 Prohibited List.127 
WADA has also added a Monitoring Program.128  In addition to 
testing for the menu of substances for in-competition and out-of-
competition, WADA’s Monitoring Program includes a shorter list of 
substances, which are also tested for.129  The purpose of the 
monitoring program is to enable WADA “to detect patterns of 
misuse in sport.”130  The Monitoring Program is proof that WADA is 
keeping a close eye on the pattern of drugs in sports in order to make 
adjustments to the Prohibited List. 
V.  RULE 2.1’S STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD 
In Vencill, the CAS panel used Rule 2.1.1 to reject Vencill’s plea 
for a reduced sanction under 10.5.2’s “No Significant Fault or 
Negligence Standard.”131  Rule 2.1 contains the strict liability standard 
that is applied to positive tests—the mere “presence of a Prohibited 
Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in an Athlete’s bodily 
Specimen”132 is sufficient to establish a doping violation, and intent, 
fault, negligence, or knowing use need not be demonstrated.133  In a 
comment to Rule 2.1.1, the Code explains the rationale behind this 
strict liability standard by quoting a 1994 CAS case, Quigley v. UIT.134  
The Quigley case involved a skeet shooter who was competing in a 
World Cup event in Cairo, Egypt.  He was ill during the competition 
and consulted with a local doctor.135  The doctor, despite knowing 
English and looking over the list of banned substances shown to him 
by Quigley, provided him with a cough syrup that contained 
ephedrine, a banned substance.136  Following an in-competition test, 
 
 127. 2006 Prohibited List, supra note 104, at 7. 
 128. The Code, supra note 2, art. 4.5, at 18-19. 
 129. WADA, International Standard, The 2006 Monitoring Program, available at 
http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/Monitoring_Program_2006_Eng.pdf. 
 130. The Code, supra note 2, art. 4.5, at 14-15. 
 131. Vencill CAS Decision, supra note 65, at 23. 
 132. The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1, at 8. 
 133. Id. art. 2.1.1, at 8. 
 134. Quigley v. UIT, CAS 94/129, 193 (Ct. Arb. Sport 1994). 
 135. Id. at 187-88. 
 136. Id. at 188. 
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Quigley tested positive for ephedrine and was banned by UIT.137  
However, CAS reversed the sanctions because, although they upheld 
the strict liability standard, they found that UIT’s rules were not clear 
enough to be enforceable.138  The “well-stated” rationale for strict 
liability in the Quigley decision said that 
It is true that a strict liability test is likely in some sense to be unfair 
in an individual case, such as that of Q., where the Athlete may 
have taken medication as the result of mislabeling or faulty advice 
for which he or she is not responsible—particularly in the 
circumstances of sudden illness in a foreign country.  But it is also 
in some sense “unfair” for an Athlete to get food poisoning on the 
eve of an important competition.  Yet in neither case will the rules 
of the competition be altered to undo the unfairness.  Just as the 
competition will not be postponed to await the Athlete’s recovery, 
so the prohibition of banned substances will not be lifted in 
recognition of its accidental absorption.  The vicissitudes of 
competition, like those of life generally, may create many types of 
unfairness, whether by accident or the negligence of unaccountable 
Persons, which the law cannot repair.  Furthermore, it appears to 
be a laudable policy objective not to repair an accidental unfairness 
to an individual by creating an intentional unfairness to whole body 
of other competitors.  This is what would happen if banned 
performance-enhancing substances were tolerated when absorbed 
inadvertently.  Moreover, it is likely that even intentional abuse 
would in many cases escape sanction for lack of proof of guilty 
intent.  And it is certain that a requirement of intent would invite 
costly litigation that may well cripple federations—particularly 
those run on modest budgets—in their fight against doping.139 
The following discussion will demonstrate why this rationale is 
inadequate to support the Code’s strict liability standard. 
A. Quigley Rationale: A Poor Analogy 
The analogy of an athlete getting sick on the eve of a competition 
to an athlete suspended due to inadvertent ingestion of a banned 
substance is simply not credible.  An athlete who is sick and forced to 
miss a competition (even a major one) will certainly suffer the loss of 
being able to compete; maybe even the loss of an entire season’s 
worth of work.  This is unfortunate, but does not hold a candle to the 
effects of being banned for two years from one’s sport through no 
fault of one’s own.  Not only do athletes who accidentally ingest a 
 
 137. Id. at 188-89. 
 138. Id. at 197-98. 
 139. The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1.1 Comment, at 8-9 (quoting Quigley v. UIT CAS 
94/129, 193 (Ct. Arb. Sport 1994)). 
05__FOSCHI.DOC 8/1/2006  3:05 PM 
476 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 16:457 
banned substance suffer the loss of a longer period of lost 
competition, they suffer the much greater harms to their reputation, 
loss of contracts or endorsements, and a mark on their record that 
will remain with them for the rest of their careers and possibly even 
beyond.  To say that it is a laudable policy to suspend some innocent 
athletes so that no guilty athlete ever competes is to belittle the years 
of preparation, dedication, and commitment to their sport that these 
athletes have contributed.140 
Such a standard easily takes an individual who is in every other 
respect a role model and turns them into the disgrace of the sporting 
world.  This concept, contrary to what many countries consider to be 
fundamentally fair,141 is offensive to the very spirit of sport that 
WADA and the Olympic Movement seek to develop and protect.  It 
might, in the short-term, protect the whole body of other competitors; 
however, in the long-term, it puts that body of competitors at risk for 
the same thing happening to them.  As Michael Straubel noted, “[i]f 
the system wrongfully punishes or harshly treats athletes it will lose 
the support of those it governs.”142 
Quigley is also a bad example for WADA to rely on because of 
its sympathetic facts.  This is exactly the kind of situation in which the 
application of a strict liability rule seems particularly disproportionate 
to the offense (if you can even call this an offense).  Additionally, the 
life-is-unfair tone of the Quigley rationale is misguided because, while 
life is indeed sometimes unfair, in the case of doping, it is WADA 
itself that is creating this particular unfairness to the athletes.  If 
anything, WADA should have a duty to minimize the unfairness that 
athletes are exposed to rather then to add to it. 
 
 140. “An athlete accused of taking a performance-enhancing drug has been accused of an 
immoral act, and in some cases, a crime.  Such an accusation can harm the athlete in a way that 
being fired from a job cannot.”  Staubel, supra note 7, at 546.  See, e.g., Kicker Vencill, supra 
note 62 (“I care about what people think about me when it comes to questioning my values and 
my integrity . . . for someone who came from a small town in the middle of nowhere in 
Kentucky where swimming doesn’t mean anything, and worked my way to a national and 
international level, only to be called a cheater when I knew it came from hard work, sacrifice 
and dedication[.]”). 
 141. See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Antonio Rigozzi & Giorgio Malinverni, Legal 
Opinion on the Conformity of Certain Provisions of the Draft World Anti-Doping Code with 
Commonly Accepted Principles of International Law, Feb. 26, 2003, at 30, available at 
http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/kaufmann-kohler-full.pdf [hereinafter Legal 
Opinion] (“[C]ritics argue that strict liability doping offences aim to catch the majority of the 
‘guilty’ parties while sacrificing a few ‘innocent’ ones: a concept incompatible with the basic 
tenets of civilized societies.”). 
 142. Straubel, supra note 8, at 569. 
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In a commendable effort to improve the legitimacy of its 
organization, WADA had a legal opinion (hereinafter Legal 
Opinion) rendered in 2003 on specific provisions of its Code and their 
conformity with “commonly accepted principles of international 
law.”143  The opinion, authored by three legal experts, analyzed 
several Code provisions, compared them to standards of international 
law (in particular notions of human rights) and either approved the 
provisions, or suggested changes.144  Of note for this discussion, the 
opinion found that “[s]trict liability doping offences are, in and of 
themselves, consistent with internationally recognized human rights 
and general principles of law.”145  However, the opinion makes clear 
that the reason that WADA’s Rule 2.1 does not violate such 
principles is because the strict liability standard only applies to the 
finding of a doping violation (due to the bifurcated nature of the 
Code), and because “the only automatic consequence of the strict 
liability offence rule is that the athlete is disqualified from the 
competition which produced the positive test.”146  In other words, the 
hook that keeps the Code’s strict liability rule from violating human 
rights and general principles of international law is the inclusion of 
sections 10.5.1 and 10.5.2 (discussed below).  Yet, the original version 
of the Code did not even include Article 10.5 at all, and it was only 
added at the recommendation of this Legal Opinion.147  So, while the 
Legal Opinion declares that the wording of 10.5 complies with the 
principle of nulla poena sine culpa (no punishment without fault),148 
the question remains whether the effect of 10.5 (in particular 10.5.1 
and 10.5.2) complies with this standard. 
B. Rules 10.5.1 and 10.5.2: Real Possibilities or Mere Tautology? 
One of the most hopeful changes in the shift from pre-WADA to 
WADA standards was the inclusion of the principles embodied in 
Rule 10.5.1 and Rule 10.5.2 of the Code.  These are the provisions 
that were included to balance out the strict liability standard of Rule 
2.1 by providing an opportunity for an athlete with “exceptional 
 
 143. Legal Opinion, supra note 141, at 5. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 31. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 39 (“[W]e recommended adding a provision specifying that an athlete could not 
be suspended, unless at fault. Following this recommendation, Article 10.5 was added to the 
Code.”). 
 148. Id. at 40. 
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circumstances” to have their sanction reduced or eliminated.149  In 
theory, this is possible to do under these two provisions.  The Code 
provides examples of what would and would not satisfy the standards 
of these provisions.  For instance, the comment to 10.5.2 says that 
sabotage by a competitor, despite all due care, would be sufficient for 
meeting the “no fault or negligence” standard, but the following 
situations would not be sufficient: a mislabeled or contaminated 
vitamin or nutritional supplement; the administration of a prohibited 
substance by a personal physician or trainer even if the athlete did not 
know; or sabotage of food or drink by a spouse, coach, or other 
closely related individual.150  The comment adds that any of these 
situations might be able to meet the “No Significant Fault or 
Negligence” standard and gives the particular example of an athlete 
who “clearly establishes that the cause of the positive test was 
contamination in a common multiple vitamin purchased from a 
source with no connection to Prohibited Substances and the Athlete 
exercised care in not taking other nutritional supplements.”151 
While it is comforting to know that these provisions have been 
included in the code, it is not clear yet whether they are actually 
viable, working Code provisions.  There is the potential that Rule 
2.1.1 will always be used to say, in a sense, “you should have done 
more.”  For example, in Vencill, the CAS panel accepted his evidence 
that he had no knowledge that the multivitamin he was taking was 
contaminated, and that the taking of this contaminated multivitamin 
is what caused his positive test result.152  This sounds quite similar to 
the explanatory comment discussed above.  However, the panel also 
found that Vencill did not exercise enough care in the taking of his 
supplements to get a reduction under 10.5.2.153  The panel went so far 
as to blast Vencill for his “significant” fault, “total disregard of his 
 
 149. The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1.1 Comment, at 8-9.  The 2.1.1 Comment reads in part: 
“[t]he strict liability rule for the finding of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Specimen, 
with a possibility that sanctions may be modified based on specified criteria, provides a 
reasonable balance between effective anti-doping enforcement for the benefit of all “clean” 
Athletes and fairness in the exceptional circumstances where a Prohibited Substance entered an 
Athlete’s system through no fault or negligence on the Athlete’s part.”  The Code, supra note 2, 
art. 10.5.2 Comment, at 30-32 (“Article 10.5 is meant to have an impact only in cases where the 
circumstances are truly exceptional and not in the vast majority of cases.”). 
 150. Id. art. 10.5.2 Comment, at 30-32. 
 151. Id. (emphasis added). 
 152. Vencill CAS Decision, supra note 65, at 23. 
 153. Id. at 25. 
05__FOSCHI.DOC 8/1/2006  3:05 PM 
2006] INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST DOPING IN SPORT 479 
positive duty” under 2.1, and “willful blindness.”154  The panel viewed 
Vencill as not only falling short of the standard in 10.5.2, but falling 
far short of it.  Yet, the decision does not indicate how much care 
would have been enough in Vencill’s case to have satisfied 10.5.2.  
The apparent near impossibility of meeting the 10.5.2 standard, not to 
mention the 10.5.1 standard, effectively reduces these provisions to 
empty words.  It is hard to imagine how anyone would prove that, 
despite due care, they were sabotaged by another competitor. 
The Vencill situation presents evidence of the insurmountable 
burden on the athlete.  Vencill was reprimanded for not testing his 
supplements prior to using them.  Indeed, it seems that the general 
position of WADA, endorsed by CAS, is that in order to live up to 
the 2.1.1 standard, an athlete must test every bottle of every 
supplement that he or she uses, must guard these bottles against any 
kind of sabotage from a competitor or a close relation, and might 
even want to get their food and drink tested as well, just to be sure.  
In today’s world, where it is not only common for athletes but non-
athletes as well to take nutritional supplements for basic health, this 
standard is not realistic.  Even in the face of warnings given to 
athletes, it is unreasonable to expect that anyone, even elite athletes, 
could control the chemical make-up of every substance that enters 
their body.  The WADA rules seem to operate in a world, which 
naively hopes that such a burden can easily be complied with by 
responsible and careful attention to supplement use.  However, 
athletes subject to its rules live and act in the real world, where 
normal mistakes, inaccuracies, and variability make such a hope 
infeasible. 
There seems to be no limit to how far 2.1.1 can be used to reject 
any defense the athlete puts forward.  In essence, if Rule 2.1.1 rejects 
almost any excuse under 10.5.1 and 10.5.2, then these provisions have 
no effect at all.  Thus, it can be argued that these provisions are 
included in the Code as empty language solely to satisfy the 
requirements of the Legal Opinion. 
C. Back to Quigley: Fear of the Floodgates155 
With respect to inadvertent ingestion of a banned substance, 
World Anti-Doping Agency Chairman Dick Pound said “there could 
be no leniency in such cases without destroying the system’s 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Legal Opinion, supra note 141, at 29-30. 
05__FOSCHI.DOC 8/1/2006  3:05 PM 
480 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 16:457 
credibility.”156  This is the unsubstantiated fear of the international 
sporting community of what would happen in the absence of a strict 
liability standard.  An additional fear, which the Quigley opinion 
forecasted, is that “a requirement of intent would invite costly 
litigation that may well cripple federations.”157  The real threat to the 
system’s credibility and to the pocketbooks of the federations, 
however, is that athletes do not believe that the system is working, 
and that drug scandals are pushing fans and future athletes away from 
athletics. 
WADA’s use of the Quigley quote as its rationale for strict 
liability is an example of the feared alternative to strict liability—the 
collapse of the whole system and guilty athletes getting away with 
doping.  Yet, there are other possible alternatives to strict liability 
that maintain a heavy burden on the athlete but provide them with a 
real chance to prove their innocence.  Such a possibility is discussed 
below in Part VI.  Furthermore, no one is necessarily advocating a 
system in which the burden is on the federation to prove, even after a 
positive test, that an athlete intended to dope or cheat.  This would be 
just as unreasonable as the current system and would lead to the 
results feared by WADA. 
The strict liability standard can also be said to overshoot even 
the tough barrier it is meant to erect.  For example, the unlikelihood 
of success (because of the strict liability standard) combined with the 
costs of litigation borne by the athlete, has lead at least one athlete 
who claimed innocence not to pursue a legal challenge.158  Certainly, 
while the system is not meant to let an accused athlete out of a 
sanction by fanciful legal arguments, it is also not meant to have the 
effect of deterring an innocent athlete from even making such 
arguments. 
 
 156. Amy Shipley, Caught Cheating, or Was She Cheated?  Area swimmer has few options 
after positive test, WASH. POST, at D1 (Nov. 8, 2004), available at http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32870-2004Nov7.html. 
 157. The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1.1 Comment, at 8-9. 
 158. Rachel Burke, a 21-year-old swimmer at the University of Virginia, tested positive in 
June of 2004 for a small amount of a steroid called Boldione.  While she initially vowed to fight 
to result, “the more she learned about the process . . . the more resigned she became.  The 
USADA has never lost a case.  The [CAS], which hears appeals of USADA decisions, applies 
the same rules as the USADA.  And the costs of paying the legal, technical, and medical experts 
necessary to prove her claims seemed both daunting and, ultimately, useless.”  Burke was 
quoted as saying that “[i]t was adding up to quite a pretty penny . . . for me to be able to tell 
them I didn’t do this, and then they would look me in the eye and say ‘I’m sorry, you know the 
rules.’”  Shipley, supra note 156. 
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D. Towards the Future: Non-Analytical Positives 
The BALCO scandal, discussed above, not only changed the 
world of drug testing because of THG, but it also supplied the first 
“non-analytical positives.”159  Traditionally, a positive drug test results 
from an “analytical positive” under WADA Rule 2.1.  That is, “[t]he 
presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in 
an athlete’s bodily specimen.”160  If an athlete takes an in-competition 
or out-of-competition drug test, and the lab reports a positive finding, 
this is an example of an analytical positive.  Conversely, a “non-
analytical positive” is a doping violation which is the result of 
anything other than a positive laboratory test, such as admitting to the 
use of a prohibited substance or trafficking in a prohibited 
substance.161 
In these cases, the anti-doping organization162 has the burden to 
prove there has been a doping violation.163  The organization must 
prove this “to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing body 
bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation which is made.”164  In 
meeting this burden, the organization may use “any reliable means, 
including admissions.”165  Thus, circumstantial evidence can be used to 
find a doping violation, although “[t]here is little guidance regarding 
what type of evidence may be used or how much is enough to convict 
an athlete of a doping offense.”166 
The type of non-analytical positives resulting from the BALCO 
situation expanded upon the prior understanding of non-analytical 
positives.167  The USADA actually used circumstantial evidence to 
show that a doping violation had occurred due to use or attempted use 
 
 159. See Cameron A. Myler, How Much Is Enough?  Using Circumstantial Evidence to 
Prosecute Olympic-Sport Athletes for Anti-Doping Rule Violations, 16 N.Y. ST. B.A. ENT. ARTS 
& SPORTS L.J. 8, 10 (2005), available at http://www.nysba.org/template.cfm?Section=Home& 
Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=65691. 
 160. The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1, at 8. 
 161. Id. arts. 2.3-2, at 8 (providing for non-analytical positives); see also, Myler, supra note 
156, at 9. 
 162. Unlike analytical positives, where the athlete bears the burden of adducing evidence to 
rebut the presumption of doping, for non-analytical positives, “the burden never shifts to the 
athlete and the anti-doping organization must prove each element of its case.”  Myler, supra 
note 159, at 9. 
 163. The Code, supra note 2, art. 3.1, at 12. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. art. 3.2, at 12. 
 166. Myler, supra note 159, at 9. 
 167. Id. 
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of a prohibited substance or method.168  These cases were 
revolutionary because of both the expansion of the role of anti-
doping agencies into investigative areas and also for using all 
evidence available to determine use of a prohibited substance in the 
absence of a traditional positive test.  The significance of the BALCO 
cases is in their potential precedent.  In these cases, all facts and 
circumstances were considered even in the absence of a positive test.  
These cases recognized the fact that a positive test does not always 
tell the whole story.  If this is the trend in doping, it should lead to 
more facts and circumstances considered even when there is a 
traditional analytical positive test. 
VI.  PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
A. Giving Effect to the Word of the Code 
As discussed previously, the strict liability standard currently 
employed by WADA affords an innocent athlete virtually no 
opportunity to be fully exonerated.  Yet, on the flip side, giving the 
federations the burden to prove an athlete’s guilt is equally 
unappealing.169  Therefore, this Note proposes a system where a 
positive test raises a rebuttable presumption of a doping violation.170  
No sanction shall be imposed or even recommended until a hearing 
has taken place in front of AAA (or the comparable NADO 
sanctioned adjudicatory body in other countries171).  At this 
arbitration hearing, the athlete will be able to offer any evidence and 
arguments he or she may have on his or her behalf, to both the 
validity of the test itself and to any extraordinary circumstances, 
 
 168. See USADA v. Gaines, CAS 2004/O/649, 25 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2004); USADA v. 
Montgomery, CAS 2004/O/645, 24 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2004) (both cases charged and sanctioned the 
athlete for the use of various performance-enhancing drugs although neither had ever tested 
positive for in an actual drug test); see also, French v. ASC and Cycling Australia, CAS 
2004/A/651, 3-4 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2004) (non-analytical positive was determined because of a 
bucket of used syringes and banned substance found a hotel room which French had previously 
occupied). 
 169. “[I]t would be both very difficult and very costly for a sports federation to prove the 
fault of an athlete.  An athlete is undoubtedly in a better position than a sports federation to 
explain why a specific substance was detected in his or her body.  In this regard, it should be 
emphasized that sports federations are private bodies that lack the powers of coercion necessary 
to undertake the type of investigation required to discharge such a burden.”  Legal Opinion, 
supra note 141, at 41. 
 170. “[I]t is clear that the presumption of fault . . . is not only appropriate but also essential 
in order to pursue an efficient anti-doping policy.”  Id. 
 171. The Code, supra note 2, art. 13.2.2, at 38. 
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which could lead to mitigation of the sanction.  Only after such 
evidence is presented would there be any determination of whether 
there was a doping violation.  Furthermore, this determination would 
be made taking into account both the validity of the test and any 
mitigating circumstances offered by the athlete.  A doping violation 
would be found if the athlete is at fault in any way for the presence of 
the banned substance in their specimen.  If the athlete proves no 
fault, then there will be no doping violation.172  After a doping 
violation is found or not found, a sanction will be determined, based 
on the extent of the athletes fault, ranging from a warning to a two-
year suspension (for first-time offenses) and from two-years-and-one-
day, to a lifetime suspension (for a successive offense).173 
This might sound similar to the current system under the Code, 
and it is.  Yet, unlike the current Code, Articles 10.5.1 and 10.5.2 
would be used and implemented with the spirit in which they were 
added to the Code.  Otherwise, there has been no change since the 
pre-WADA system.  Additionally, if these sections are not given real 
effect, WADA risks violating human rights guarantees.174  This system 
would offer a true case-by-case analysis, protecting the accused 
athlete’s rights, while at the same time keeping the entire burden on 
the athlete to prove no fault.  The focus would be on determining an 
appropriate level of punishment, if any, that is proportionate to the 
athlete’s degree of fault.  Finally, this system would not alter the 
number or basic nature of the hearings, therefore keeping the costs to 
the anti-doping organization at their current rate. 
B. Additional Recommendations 
This Note recommends several improvements for the current 
problems with the adequacy of testing.  It breaks its 
recommendations into two categories, based on the two different 
 
 172. This proposal would alter the present bifurcated nature of the current WADA rules.  
The process would still be bifurcated into a determination of a doping violation followed by a 
determination of the proper sanction, yet the factors considered in each stage will be altered and 
the emphasis would be on the latter phase. 
 173. If it is a second or subsequent offense, that will be a factor in determining both if there 
was a doping violation and what the appropriate sanction should be. 
 174. Legal Opinion, supra note 141, at 35-39.  “There is considerable debate as to whether 
human rights apply to doping disputes.  This being so, there are arguments in favour of their 
application and it may be that in the future, courts will enforce human right guarantees in sport 
matters.  Hence, the Code should be in conformity with human rights and general principles of 
law.”  Legal Opinion, supra note 139, at 5. 
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forms of false positive—those caused by contaminated supplements 
and those caused by mistakes in the laboratory. 
The first recommendation is directed specifically at the problem 
of unregulated supplements, discussed supra.  In the absence of any 
change in the regulation patterns of countries, there needs to be a 
response from WADA.  As of now, with the evidence of 
contamination, the burden placed on the athletes is just too heavy to 
be reasonable.  Part of easing this burden would be to back away 
from the strict liability standard as discussed supra in Part VI.  In 
addition, WADA should assist athletes in narrowing down the 
choices of supplements.  One possibility is to institute a program in 
which WADA would contract with supplement 
companies/manufacturers to endorse their products to all athletes in 
exchange for the company’s use of certain quality standards.  Such 
standards might include the testing of each batch of supplements that 
they produce or compliance with strict manufacturing standards to 
ensure that no banned substances are being produced at the same 
plant as their ‘clean’ substances.  On top of this, the company would 
accept liability for any athlete that can prove they tested positive from 
the contamination of one of their products.175  The encouragement of 
more programs such as these would provide safer choices for athletes. 
The second recommendation is intended to help protect athletes 
from the demands on WADA-accredited laboratories.  Under current 
WADA rules, the only way to prevent a finding of a “doping 
violation” under Rule 2.1 is to prove that the test itself was 
inaccurate.  However, since the laboratory is in full custody of the 
specimen from start to finish of the test, it is difficult for an athlete to 
ever prove any problems with the test itself.  One simple way to place 
an extra check of the laboratories would be to send the A and B 
samples176 to separate laboratories.  This would reduce the possibility 
of false positives and prevent a laboratory from covering a false 
positive test up by matching the B sample to the A (as both tests are 
in its control). 
 
 175. At least one Canadian company has already taken such a step.  See USANA Press 
Release, Jan.15, 2004, available at http://www.usanahealthsciences.com/news/news/15Jan04.pdf 
(USANA, a nutritional supplement manufacturer, offers a one million dollar guarantee to elite 
Canadian athletes against positive drug tests as a result of any of their products). 
 176. When an athlete provides a sample to a doping organization, the sample is separated 
into an A sample and a B sample (labeled with the same sample number), which are both sealed 
and sent to the same laboratory. 
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CONCLUSION 
The international fight against doping has come a long way since 
the days of confusing rules and divergent systems of the pre-1999 
anti-doping administration.  WADA is a tool that can be effectively 
used by the international community to put a large dent into the plans 
of a devious athlete.  However, great precaution must be taken to 
ensure that the desire to rid the sport of cheaters does not carelessly 
allow innocent athletes to bear the same label without the same fault. 
As this Note has exhibited, many avenues leading to false 
positives still exist.  It has illustrated there are things that athletes 
cannot avoid (despite the highest levels of care).  It has further 
demonstrated that in such situations athletes are consistently left with 
no recourse, as they cannot meet the proof standards required under 
WADA.  With this knowledge, WADA has a responsibility not only 
to protect all athletes from cheaters, but also to protect innocent 
athletes from false positives.  If WADA does not make adjustments 
to its policy in order to do this, it is shirking its responsibility to those 
yet-unidentified athletes.  The Vencill case provides an example of 
such an athlete.  Instead of protecting him, the system reprimanded 
him for not living up to the unbearable burden of Rule 2.1.1.  A 
system that fears cheaters so much that it is willing to sacrifice the 
Kicker Vencills of the world is a system that is hurting those it was 
created to protect. 
WADA rules 10.5.1 and 10.5.2 contain the potential for a fair 
and effective system.  However, so far these provisions have been 
reduced to mere words and are seemingly easily quashed by the 
burden of Rule 2.1.1.  According to the 2003 Legal Opinion procured 
by WADA, without the effect of these two provisions, the Code 
violates human rights and general principles of International Law.  
WADA must, as it is doing in the circumstance of non-analytical 
positives, keep moving towards a practice of considering all the facts 
and circumstances on a case-by-case basis and give each athlete a fair 
and real opportunity to prove their innocence. 
Taking a step back from Code provisions and legal opinions, the 
main goal of an anti-doping organization is to catch cheaters—those 
intending to disrespect their sport by enhancing their performance.  
The concept of a ‘cheater’ without a doubt involves intent on the part 
of the individual involved.  A system to catch cheaters, which 
disregards intent, is destined to sweep up many innocent individuals 
in its path.  If WADA and the international community can live with 
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that on their conscience, then doping has truly taken a toll on the 
spirit of sport. 
